



**NSW Police Force**  
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Camden Council  
70 Central Avenue, Oran Park  
NSW 2570.  
21st May, 2019.

**DA2019/269/1- 76 Central Avenue and 62-68 Central Avenue ORAN PARK.**

On Tuesday 21st May 2019, a Safer by Design Evaluation was conducted on **DA: DA2019/269/1** for the proposed construction of a 6- storey commercial building with three level basement car park and rooftop terrace area as well as associated earth works, civil works and landscaping.

In April 2001 the NSW Minister for Planning introduced Crime Prevention Guidelines to Section 79C of the Environmental Planning and assessment Act, 1979. These guidelines require consent authorities to ensure that development provides safety and security to users and the community. 'If a development presents a crime risk, the guidelines can be used to justify modification of the development on the grounds that crime risk cannot be appropriately minimised'.

The Guidelines contain two parts. 'Part A details the need for a formal crime risk assessment (Safer by Design Evaluation) to be done in conjunction with trained police, and Part B outlines basic Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles and strategies that can be used by consent authorities to justify the modification proposals to minimise risk'. (DUAP 2001:2)

### **Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)**

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a crime prevention strategy that focuses on the planning, design and structure of cities and neighbourhoods. It reduces opportunities for crime by using design and place management principles that reduce the likelihood of essential crime ingredients from intersecting in time and space.

**CAMDEN Local Area Command**  
Narellan Police Station

Predatory offenders often make cost-benefit assessments of potential victims and locations before committing crime. CPTED aims to create the reality (or perception) that the costs of committing crime are greater than the likely benefits. This is achieved by creating environmental and social conditions that:

- Maximise risk to offenders (increasing the likelihood of detection, challenge and apprehension).
- Maximise the effort required to commit crime (increasing the time, energy and resources required to commit crime)
- Minimise the actual and perceived benefits of crime (removing, minimising or concealing crime attractors and rewards) and
- Minimise excuse making opportunities (removing conditions that encourage/facilitate rationalisation of inappropriate behaviour)

CPTED employs four key strategies. These are surveillance, access control, territorial re-enforcement and space/activity management.

- Surveillance
- Access Control,
- Territorial re-enforcement and
- Space/activity management.

## Site Description

The proposed development is for the construction a 6- storey commercial building with three level basement car park and rooftop terrace area as well as associated earth works, civil works and landscaping.

## Site Risk Rating

The NSW Police Safer by Design Evaluation process is based upon Australia and New Zealand Risk Management Standard ANZS4360:1999. It is a contextually flexible, transparent process that identifies and quantifies crime hazards and location risk. Evaluation measures include crime likelihood (statistical probability), consequence (crime outcome), distributions of reported crime (hotspot analysis), socio-economic conditions (relative disadvantage), situational hazards and crime opportunity.

After conducting this process the rating for this development has been identified as, **low Crime Risk.**



## Surveillance

Natural surveillance is achieved when normal space users can see and be seen by others. This highlights the importance of building layout, orientation and location; the strategic use of design; landscaping and lighting. *Natural surveillance* is a by-product of well-planned, well-designed and well-used space. *Technical/mechanical Surveillance* is achieved through mechanical/electronic measures such as CCTV, help points and mirrored building panels. *Technical/mechanical Organised) Surveillance* is achieved through the tactical positioning of guardians. An example would be the use of on-site supervisors at higher risk locations.

*Natural surveillance* is an important element capable guardianship. When supervision is lacking, the perception of surveillance can be created to deter opportunistic criminals. Offenders often scan their surroundings to see if they are being watched. Objects, areas and structures capable of concealing an offender (especially near pedestrian routes) increase crime risk.

Natural surveillance opportunities during construction for this development in the day will be acceptable with the substantial amount of workers required. The issues will come overnight and the weekend. Building materials including copper wiring and piping are highly sought after as scrap metal due to their value, therefore measures should be put in place to deter offenders when there are no persons around.

With this in mind it may be necessary to increase surveillance opportunities by using either technical/mechanical (Closed Circuit Television Systems etc) or organised (using people to supervise areas) treatment options.

### Recommendations;

- 1) Entry points should be designed so as to maximize surveillance opportunities to and from these areas from both inside, as well as outside.
- 2) Residential setbacks (such as front yards) act as a transition or buffer between private and public space. These areas require good sight lines from private vantage points to public areas.
- 3) Store and Electrical Meter Rooms need to have doors locked at all times.
- 4) Doors into Electrical Meter Rooms, to have approved Power Company locks and doors to be kept locked at all times.

- 5) All vegetation/ Landscaping to be trimmed on a regular basis to ensure it is kept to a minimal height i.e eye level, at all times.
- 6) Ensure all barriers and panels around the dwellings are transparent.
- 7) CCTV cameras to be installed in and around car parking areas, and to be installed by licensed, qualified security professionals.
- 8) Effective lighting to be installed in and around the car parking areas as well as the public / private areas.
- 9) As the proposed development may be exposed to Break Enter and Steals, Stealing, Steal from persons, Malicious Damage and Steal from Motor Vehicle offences, a closed circuit television system (CCTV) which complies with the Australian Standard – Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV) AS:4806:2006 needs to be implemented to receive, hold or process data for the identification of people involved in anti social or criminal behaviour. The system is obliged to conform with Federal, State or Territory Privacy and Surveillance Legislation. This system should consist of surveillance cameras strategically located in and around the development to provide maximum surveillance coverage of the area, particularly in areas which are difficult to supervise.
- 10) CCTV Cameras should be strategically mounted outside the development buildings and within the car parking areas to monitor activity within these areas.
- 11) One or more CCTV cameras should be positioned at the entry and exit points to monitor these areas ( i.e underground car park, and stair well access).
- 12) Digital technology should be used to receive, store and process data. Recording equipment should be secured away from public access areas to restrict tampering with the equipment and data. This equipment needs to be checked and maintained on a regular basis.
- 13) It is crucial even in the development stage that the CCTV cameras are installed as soon as power is available to the site.
- 14) Garbage disposal areas and other communal spaces should not be located in a buildings 'leftover space'. Poor supervision of communal facilities can greatly increase the risk of predatory crime, theft and vandalism. Areas that are unused or sporadically used after hours and unsupervised should not be accessible to the public.

#### Lighting ( Surveillance)



There is a proven correlation between poor lighting, fear of crime, the avoidance of public places and crime opportunity (Painter, 1997). Good lighting can assist in increasing the usage of an area. Further information is required within the plans, which were reviewed to indicate the lighting proposals for the street lighting and car park, i.e. the positioning of the lights next to vegetation is of a concern due to reducing the spread of the lighting.

Lighting should meet minimum standards. Crime and fear reduction are specified as key objectives in Australian lighting standard AS1158 for public streets, car parks and pedestrian areas.

Effective lighting contributes to public safety by reducing fear, increasing community activity, improving visibility and increasing the chance that offenders will be detected and apprehended. The Canadian METRAC Group (Toronto City Council) recommends a 15 metre facial recognition test in public places. This yardstick is often applied as a non-technical measure of lighting effectiveness.

Walking from overtly bright places into dark places, or dark to light places can lessen a pedestrian's ability to see and recognize people, objects and colours. Transition lighting can help to reduce (night) vision impairment.

#### **Recommendations:**

- 1) Lighting should be designed to the Australian and New Zealand Lighting Standards.
- 2) Australia and New Zealand Lighting Standard 1158.1 – Pedestrian, requires lighting engineers and designers to consider crime risk and fear when selecting lamps and lighting levels.
- 3) Lighting layout for the outdoor areas should be Anti Vandal type lights which are a better option, for both lighting and maintenance.
- 4) Australian and New Zealand Lighting Standard 1158 – Car Parks, must be used especially in undercover type parking in each block.
- 5) Public area lighting must be bright and even (to permit facial recognition of approaching persons at 15 metres).
- 6) Public or outdoor lighting to be addressed to ensure it complies and is effective.
- 7) All lighting should be vandal proof throughout the complex.

- 8) Improved lighting needs to extend from the development towards adjacent streets. Consideration must be given to pedestrians walking from the development to surrounding streets for the purpose of catching public transport etc. Areas adjoining pathways should be illuminated to avoid opportunities for concealment and entrapment.

### **Landscaping ( Surveillance)**

Landscaping can be used to enhance the appearance of the development and assist in reducing opportunities for vandalism. However, landscaping can also provide concealment or entrapment areas for people involved **in criminal behaviour**.

### **Recommendations:**

- 1) Some predatory offenders seek pockets and enclosures created by vegetation/landscaping. When selecting and maintaining vegetation, consideration should be given to the possibility of areas becoming entrapment sites in the future especially at rear open space areas.
- 2) A safety convention is to have 3-5 metres of cleared space on either side of pathways. Thereafter, vegetation is stepped back in height to maximise sightlines.
- 3) A safety convention for vegetation is: lower tree limbs should be above average head height, and shrubs should not provide easy concealment.
- 4) Landscaping can greatly interfere with residential setbacks (such as front yards). These areas require good sight lines from private vantage points to public areas therefore it is important that landscaping does not inhibit surveillance.
- 5) Landscaping close to and around the dwelling should be regularly maintained to ensure branches cannot act as natural ladders to gain access to higher parts of the dwelling, and to assist with natural surveillance in and around the dwellings.
- 6) Vegetation to be 3-5 metres clear of pathways.
- 7) Warning signs should be strategically posted around the buildings to warn intruders of what security treatments have been implemented to reduce opportunities for crime. Warning, trespassers will be prosecuted. Warning, these premises are under electronic surveillance.
- 8) Directional signage should be posted at decision making points (eg. Entry/egress points) to provide guidance to the uses of the development. This



can also assist in access control and reduce excuse making opportunities by intruders.

- 9) A Fire Safety Statement must be prominently displayed within the development to comply with the Environmental Planning & Assessment Regulations (1994) Clause 80GB. The annual fire safety statement is a statement issued by the owner of a building.
- 10) Signage needs to be provided at fire exits to assist occupants to identify exits in emergency situations.
- 11) Signage needs to be provided to assist occupants to identify fire suppression equipment, eg extinguishers, fire hoses etc.
- 12) A graffiti management plan to be incorporated into the maintenance plan for the development. Research has shown that the most effective strategy for reducing graffiti attacks is the quick removal of such material generally within **24 hours**.

## Access Control

Access control should be designed to limit the opportunity for crime by taking steps to clearly delineate public, semi-public and private space. This can be achieved by using physical and symbolic barriers to attract, channel or restrict the movement of people into and throughout the development. By making it clear where people are permitted to go or not go, it becomes difficult for potential offenders to reach and victimise people and their property. Illegal boundary markers and confusing spatial definition make it easy for criminals to make excuses for being in restricted areas. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that the barriers are not tall or hostile, creating the effect of a compound.

Effective access control can be achieved by creating:

- Landscapes and physical locations that channel and group people into target areas
- Spaces which attract, rather than discourage people from gathering.
- Restricted access to internal areas or high risk areas (like car parks or other rarely visited areas). This is often achieved through the use of physical barriers.

### Recommendations;

- 1) The door and door frames to these premises should be of solid construction. Doors should be fitted with locks that comply with the Australian Standard –

Mechanical Locksets for doors in buildings, AS:4145:1993, to restrict unauthorised access and the Building Code of Australia (fire regulations). This standard specifies the general design criteria, performance requirements and procedures for testing mechanical lock sets and latch sets for their resistance to forced entry and efficiency under conditions of light to heavy usage. The standard covers lock sets for typical doorways, such as wooden, glass or metal hinged swinging doors or sliding doors in residential premises. Requirements for both the lock and associated furniture are included. Certain areas may require higher level of locking devices not referred to in this standard (eg. Locking bars, electronic locking devices and detection devices) **Dead locks are required for residential units.**

- 2) The main access to the car park should have restricted access with a security pass. The opening/closing mechanism should be protected from vandalism and tampering. All exit doors from the car park should have striker plates installed to minimise chance of tampering.
- 3) There needs to be a limit to how many exit and entry points are available to the car park.

## Territorial Re-enforcement

Territorial re-enforcement promotes control through increased definition of space and improved proprietary controls. An environment designed to clearly delineate private and public spaces does a number of things. Owners have a vested interest in the space and are more likely to take the appropriate action to protect such space. Strangers or intruders stand out in that space and are more easily identified. Buildings, fences, footpaths, signs, lighting and landscape can be used to delineate space and express ownership of space. Space which is not clearly defined may encourage anti-social or criminal behaviour.

Territorial reinforcement can be achieved through:

- Design that encourages people to gather in space and to feel some responsibility for its use and condition.
- Design with clear transitions and boundaries between public and private space
- Clear design cues on who is to use the space and what it is to be used for. Care is needed to ensure that territorial reinforcement is not achieved by making public spaces, private spaces through gates and enclosures.

**Landscaping :** Can be an effective and pleasant instrument to define space. Hedges and trees should not cause an area to be enclosed, restricting natural surveillance. Landscaping should lead pedestrians onto the nominated pathways.



**Vegetation:** Hedges and shrubs should not be higher than 900mm. Large high branching trees provide shade, shelter and add to the attraction of environments. The lower tree limbs should be above average head height so they do not restrict vision. The use of thorny bushes may aid in restricting access to areas while still appealing to the eye.

### **Recommendations:**

- 1) The boundaries of the development to be well defined and re-enforced by fencing and landscaping.
- 2) Car park design and definitional legibility can help (or hinder) way finding. Knowing how and where to enter/exit and find assistance can impact perceptions of safety, victim vulnerability and crime opportunity. Signage should reinforce (not be an alternative to effective design).
- 3) Signage needs to be provided at entry/exit points indicating public and private access points and areas throughout the development, to assist users and warn intruders that they will be prosecuted.
- 4) All car parking areas of each block should have signage "residents only", and signs for all visitor parking.
- 5) A graffiti management plan needs to be incorporated into the maintenance plan for the development. Research has shown that the most effective strategy for reducing graffiti attacks is the quick removal of such materials generally with a forty-eight hour period.
- 6) Graffiti resistant materials and anti-graffiti coating should be utilised throughout the development

## **Space / Activity Management**

Popular space is often attractive, well maintained and well used space. Linked to the principle of territorial reinforcement, space activity management ensures that space is appropriately utilised and well cared for.

Space/activity management strategies should include activity coordination, maintenance, rapid repair of vandalism and graffiti and the replacement of burned out lighting and the removal or refurbishment of decayed physical elements.

Space/activity management should support and increase the use of the built environment for safe activities with the intent of increasing the risk of detection to criminals and undesirable activities.

Highly functional areas are susceptible to opportunistic crime when inactive. CBDs and large developments often experience high levels of night time burglary, theft of commuter vehicles and other crime.

### **Recommendations;**

The key recommendations from the assessment include:

- Installation of CCTV cameras within and around the development
  - Improved lighting around the footpaths and car park areas within the development
  - Ensuring the building design minimises the potential for climbing onto balconies
  - Landscaping that promotes natural surveillance of common areas
  - Underground car park that does not have hidden areas or dark spots
  - Security measures in place for entry doors and lifts (security passes)
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- 1) As residents within this area have been targeted for malicious damage, break enter and steal, and stealing's, it is important that access to and from the development be established and maintained.
  - 2) There is little information to indicate the access control treatments in and around the development.
  - 3) Natural ladders are building features, trees or nearby structures that can help a criminal to climb to balconies, rooftops, ledges and windows.
  - 4) Consideration to be given to enhancing the entry into buildings with electronic access control equipment to enhance physical security.
  - 5) Intercom facilities should be incorporated into these entry/exit points at the front and back of the dwelling to enable residents to communicate and identify with people prior to admitting them to the premises. An auxiliary lock set should also be incorporated into the design of each of the entry/exit points to enable emergency services to access the development particularly in emergency situations.
  - 6) Having electronic access control equipment fitted to these areas to enhance physical security should control the doors from public to private areas.
  - 7) 'Residents only' access to underground parking through the interior of the dwelling can reduce opportunities for theft from vehicles, motor vehicle theft,



and entrapment.

- 8) Bench seating and Common Open space areas ( Public Reserve) to be maintained. Re The broken window Theory. The theory states "That maintaining and monitoring urban environments in a well-ordered condition may stop further vandalism and escalation into more serious crime".

We would like to thank you for the opportunity of inspecting the plans for this development and should you require further information on the subjects mentioned within this report feel free to contact Constable Greg Loudon, Crime Prevention Officer, Camden Local Area Command, phone 46324459 or Email loud1gre@police.nsw.gov.au

Yours faithfully,



Paul Fryer.  
A/Superintendent  
Commander  
Camden Local Area Command.

**Disclaimer**

The New South Wales Police have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of members of the community and their property. By using the recommendations contained in this evaluation, any person who does so acknowledges that:-

1. It is not possible to make areas evaluated by the New South Wales Police, absolutely safe for members of the community or their property.
2. It is based upon the information provided to the New South Wales Police, at the time the evaluation was made.
3. The evaluation is a confidential document and is for use by the consent authority or organization referred to on page 1 only.
4. The contents of this evaluation are not to be copied or circulated otherwise that for the purposes of the consent authority or organization referred to on page 1.

The New South Wales Police hopes that by using the recommendations contained in this document, criminal activity will be reduced and the safety of members of the community and their property will be increased. However, it does not guarantee that all risks have been identified, or that the area evaluated will be free from criminal activity if its recommendations are followed.